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ABSTRACT. The purpose of the research reported here is to help the community in Barrow, Alaska, clarify its vulnerability to
extreme weather events, and devise better-informed policies for reducing that vulnerability and adapting to climate variability and
change. We examine the worst disaster on record there—a storm that struck on 3 October 1963—from different disciplinary
perspectives and in the context of other severe storms. The major policy responses to date have been a beach nourishment program,
a feasibility study of additional means of erosion control, and an emergency management plan. Additional possible responses have
been identified in the community’s cumulative experience of these storms, but have not yet been fully explored or implemented.
Meanwhile, given inherent uncertainties, it is clear that sound policies will allow for corrective action if and when expectations
based on the best available knowledge and information turn out to be mistaken. It is also clear that the people of Barrow are in
the best position to understand the evolving situation and to decide what to do about it.
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RÉSUMÉ. Les travaux de recherche que l’on présente ici ont pour but d’aider la collectivité de Barrow (Alaska) à définir son degré
de vulnérabilité à des conditions climatiques extrêmes, et à créer des politiques plus éclairées qui réduiraient cette vulnérabilité
et favoriseraient l’adaptation à la variabilité et au changement climatiques. On examine le pire désastre jamais enregistré à cet
endroit, soit une tempête qui fit rage le 3 octobre 1963, et ce, sous l’angle de différentes disciplines et dans le contexte d’autres
grandes tempêtes. Jusqu’à présent, les politiques majeures d’intervention se sont résumées à un programme de recharge de plage,
à une étude de faisabilité portant sur des mesures supplémentaires de lutte contre l’érosion et à un plan de gestion des situations
d’urgence. L’expérience cumulative de la collectivité relative à ces tempêtes a permis de dégager d’autres interventions possibles,
sans qu’elles aient toutefois été explorées à fond ou concrétisées. Entre-temps, vu les incertitudes inhérentes à ce genre de choses,
il est évident que des politiques bien pensées permettront l’application de mesures correctives si et quand les prédictions fondées
sur les toutes dernières connaissances et informations disponibles s’avèrent erronées. Il est en outre évident que les habitants de
Barrow sont les mieux placés pour comprendre comment la situation évolue et pour décider des mesures à prendre.
Mots clés: politique, désastre, événement météorologique extrême, adaptation, changement climatique, Barrow, versant Nord
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INTRODUCTION
On Thursday, 3 October 1963, an intense storm struck
Barrow, Alaska, with little warning, causing more damage
there than any other storm in historical records or living
memory. The storm was an Arctic disaster, but it is also an
opportunity for research to help the community in Barrow
clarify its vulnerability to future storms and devise poli-
cies better informed by the community’s own experience
and the scientific knowledge available. In particular, this
storm, in the context of other storms, provides a basis for
projecting where and how life and limb might be threat-
ened, property damaged, and the coast eroded and flooded
by extreme weather events in the future. The community
might factor such impact information into plans for reducing
its vulnerability and for adapting to climate variability and
change. This article reports results from ongoing research
to clarify the policy implications of the 1963 storm in the
larger context of Barrow’s past and future.
This research is part of a project to integrate scientific
knowledge from a variety of disciplines with local knowl-
edge and to make that knowledge useful to people in
Barrow and on the North Slope. For scientists with similar
aspirations, this article may be useful as an example of
research on the human dimensions of the Arctic, including
human responses to climate variability and change. The
approach taken here is based on the policy sciences
(Lasswell, 1971) and draws upon natural hazards and
disaster research over the last three decades (Mileti, 1999;
Tierney et al., 2001).
THE DISASTER
The 1963 storm was “unique in its violence and conse-
quences” (Schafer, 1966:374). The low-pressure system
(or depression) that produced the strong winds, erosion,
and flooding in Barrow originated along the Arctic front
over Siberia, around 145.6˚E, late on 1 October 1963. Over
the next 24 hours, it traversed Siberia to the coast of the
East Siberian Sea and continued northward on a track
typical for such systems. However, shortly after 9:00 p.m.
(all times Alaska Standard Time) on 2 October, the storm
turned eastward and commenced a rapid deepening, reach-
ing an estimated central low pressure of 976 millibars at
11:00 a.m. on 3 October, while located in the Beaufort Sea
north of Barrow (Schafer, 1966). At this time, the winds
had already shifted from southerly to westerly and were
reaching 40 mph, with gusts up to 60 mph recorded at
Barrow (Schafer, 1966). The depression continued to in-
tensify as it traveled eastward, and the winds at Barrow
turned west-northwesterly. The strongest winds at Barrow
were reported between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m., with gusts
possibly as high as 75 or 80 mph (Rock, 1963; Hume and
Schalk, 1967). The highest official observation from the
National Weather Service was 55 mph, for wind sustained
for one minute. These extreme winds were reinforced by a
strong Aleutian high to the south with a central pressure of
1030 millibars. Between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., wind strength
at Barrow started to diminish, but the low-pressure system
continued eastward and may have reached its peak inten-
sity in the Canadian Archipelago early on 4 October.
(Reports differ on the later stages of the system.) As the
cold sector of the depression passed over Barrow, it pro-
duced a blizzard over the next few days. Unofficially, the
storm probably remains the most severe in Barrow’s records
and in the memories of residents. Guy Okakok (1963),
then the Tundra Times correspondent in Barrow, wrote: “I
am 60 years old now…and I have never seen the winds as
strong as we had that day on October 3. High winds and
high water everywhere.”
These winds caused a storm surge (or rise in sea level)
and extensive wave action. The fetch, or open water to the
point where the sea was 50% covered by ice, was around
350 miles—extending about 150 miles farther north than
the average for this time of year (although variability
across years is very high in this region). The sea level
started to rise at around 5:00 a.m. on 3 October, and the
surge reached almost 10 feet (Schafer, 1966) sometime
between 3:00 and 4:00 that afternoon. The storm surge
may have been as high as 12 feet (Hume and Schalk, 1967).
The unusual height of the surge was due primarily to the
long duration of the strong northwesterly winds, but the
rapid movement of the low-pressure system also contrib-
uted (Kowalik, 1984). As it traversed the Chukchi Sea, the
system traveled at an average speed of around 44 mph,
which is close to the speed of the surge itself. Hence there
could have been a resonance effect, in which the system
and the surge reinforced each other. Even a 40% ice cover
may have had only minimal impact on the size of the surge
(Kowalik, 1984), although sea ice at greater concentra-
tions is known to damp the generation of wind-driven
waves. The extent to which the more compact ice below
the storm had a moderating effect on the surge is unknown.
However, the large fetch certainly allowed the formation
of waves that could have reached as high as 15 feet (Anon.,
1963b).
The storm surge and wave action from the October 1963
storm caused erosion and flooding of the coastal environ-
ment. A study that compared estimated sediment transport
during the storm surge to the accumulated transport over
the years 1948 to 1962 concluded that the storm “moved
over 200,000 cubic yards of sediments, which is equiva-
lent to 20 years’ normal transport” (Hume and Schalk,
1967:86). The resulting coastline changes included shore-
line retreat, with a steepening and increase in the elevation
of the beaches. The bluffs on the southern edge of Barrow
retreated as much as 10 feet during this storm, exposing
large ice masses that subsequently melted, causing some
further shoreline collapse (Hume and Schalk, 1967). In the
Arctic, climate warming leads to thawing of the perma-
frost, which destabilizes the coastline and makes it more
vulnerable to both normal and storm-induced sediment
transport.
Because of the coastal geography, flooding from the
storm surge and waves was more extensive several miles
northeast of Barrow in the area around the Naval Arctic
Research Laboratory (NARL), which included the camp
that serviced the nearby Distant Early Warning (DEW)
line (See Fig. 1). “Near the Camp, the water flowed over
the beach and down the back slope into the Camp area. A
temporary lake was created which had an elevation of 9.2
feet above sea level. The lake extended about 3/4 of a mile
inland directly behind the Camp” (Hume and Schalk,
1967:96). Water depth generally ranged from one to three
feet in this temporary lake, which linked up with Elson
Lagoon farther to the northeast (See lower inset, Fig. 1).
Most of the spit surrounding the lagoon from NARL to
Point Barrow and Plover Point was under water. “Areas
near the village [of Barrow] were not flooded as badly
because the beaches there are backed by higher tundra”
(Hume and Schalk, 1967:96).
There was little warning to help the community respond
to these impacts. “The great storm that staggered Barrow
on October 3 happened so suddenly that even the weather
bureau did not have an idea that it was coming. There was
no warning, which meant, the people of Barrow had to do
some quick thinking to save themselves during the on-
slaught” (Rock, 1963). The Weather Bureau in Barrow did
not expect the storm because poor radio propagation had
prevented it from receiving the normal weather reports
from Soviet Siberia for several days (Anon., 1963c). Re-
markably, there were no deaths and only one serious
injury. The injury occurred when “The wind hit a pile of
sheet metal [pieces] and they took off like kites. One of
them slammed into Lawrence Ahmouak [now spelled
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FIG. 1. Photomap of Barrow, Alaska, 1997.
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“Ahmaogak”] and knocked him unconscious…. He was
the only casualty among some 1350 people living in
Barrow” (Rock, 1963) and was later treated and released
(Anon., 1963b).
Nevertheless, Guy Okakok reported several close calls,
including his own family’s. The details illuminate human
behavior during disasters (Tierney et al., 2001) and can
inform policy responses intended to reduce threats to life
and limb from extreme weather events. Like the Weather
Bureau, Okakok (1963) did not expect the storm. “Early
that morning, October 3, when we woke up around 6:30
a.m., the weather wasn’t too bad. After we had our break-
fast, my wife and I went [to work] across the lagoon
fighting through and against the wind.” They left several
children at home. But the storm had picked up by 9:00
a.m., when “a neighbor noticed the door of the house
opening, then shutting quickly as high seas pounded against
the house. The neighbor, realizing somebody must be in
the house, waited for a break in the storm, then ran over and
found the children…wanting to come out, but afraid to
leave” (Anon., 1963d). While they were at work in the
local hospital, Okakok (1963) reported, his wife “came
running to tell me that they could see big waves splashing
over buildings. I didn’t say a word to anyone. I went out
and started to run toward my home. My children were in
the house.” After crossing back over the frozen lagoon,
which already had water on it, he asked about his children
and was told they were safe at Betty Kignak’s house.
Okakok struggled over to his house, where big waves
had been splashing against the north wall, to sack up the
children’s clothes. “While I was collecting the clothes, a
wave came through the door. All at once the water was up
to my knees. As soon as the water dropped, I opened the
inside door…. Before I could let go my hands from our
doorknob, [a] second strong wave came in and pushed me
to the stoves. The house was now half full of water. I
couldn’t wait any longer and I walked through the water
and went out. I couldn’t do anything, so I watched. While
I was watching, a great strong wave came over and knocked
down my walls. Stoves, fuel, food, and clothes scattered
all over. What I could save, I saved, but [I] lost the
children’s clothes, food, range and heater.” Okakok (1963)
reported other close calls as well: “If Leo Kaleak had
waited two more minutes when he tried to reach the house
which stood on the highest ground, he said, he would have
been washed out to sea. Visibility was very bad in the
storm, and he almost got lost. Also Claire Okpeaha, 70
years old, was knocked down by a wave, and he was rolled
over and over in the water. His grandson saw him and
grabbed him just in time as he was being carried out to sea.
He then dragged his grandfather into the house.”
Okakok was given shelter, hot coffee, and dry clothes at
Betty Kignak’s house. There he heard by radio that a
Caterpillar and another heavy vehicle would be sent over
to rescue people from Browerville and take them to the
main part of town. After the Okakok family was rescued,
they were given supper at the school, a place to stay
overnight at the Presbyterian church, and clothes. Other
storm victims were also treated kindly by their neighbors,
government officials, and private organizations, including
the Red Cross. “When the storm abated, about 200 Eski-
mos were left homeless. Except for three families that
were housed in a church, all of the storm victims were
quickly taken in by relatives and friends” (Rock, 1963).
Okakok (1963) reported: “I will never forget those people
who had done so much for us.”
Less was recorded about immediate threats to life and
limb northeast of Barrow, at NARL and at the construction
camp, where flooding was most extensive. The Laborato-
ry’s monthly progress report for October, quoted by Hume
and Schalk (1967:94– 95), noted that electric power was
shut off before the peak of the storm to prevent fire. During
the peak in mid-afternoon, “All women and children were
evacuated from the Camp to the DEW line site. Most of the
damage in the area occurred at this time. The force of the
current through the camp was so strong that only Cats
could safely be driven through the streets.” Even so, a
Weasel and a D-4 Caterpillar were sunk trying to rescue a
wolf, two wolverines, and three foxes who drowned early
in the peak period. Evacuation to Barrow was blocked
after a timber bridge washed out and other parts of the
coastal road were badly eroded.
 Perhaps because flooding was more extensive at the
camp than in the village, property damage to government
installations was greater, although estimates varied in the
immediate aftermath of the storm. As repairs were being
made later, Hume and Schalk (1967:96 – 97) reported that
actual costs were close to estimates of $3 million in
damages to government installations and $250 000 to the
village. In addition to the coastal road damage mentioned
above, they listed as “major damage” to the camp “con-
tamination of the water supply [in Fresh Lake northeast of
the camp], destruction of 70 per cent of the [NARL]
airstrip, and loss of six buildings, two with scientific
equipment. Supplies and stores were floated away and
damaged by salt water…. In addition, the foundations of
almost all the buildings were eroded, a process which
usually resulted in structural damage. Three buildings, one
a large quonset [serving as a gymnasium], were actually
floated away. In all likelihood, more buildings would have
been rafted if the water level had remained high for a
greater period of time.” Imikpuk Lake, the fresh water
source between NARL and the DEW Line, was contami-
nated by salt water and sewage, as well as by fuel oil
(Anon., 1963e).
The main losses in the village, according to Hume and
Schalk (1967:97), were “32 homes, 15 of which were
totally destroyed; 250,000 gallons of fuel; and three small
airplanes.” One of the earliest accounts reported “Total
damage…over $1 million; with most of this occurring to
private persons, the native Co-op Store, Central Construc-
tion Co., Wien Alaska Airlines, Golden Valley Electric,
and federal property” (Anon., 1963f). A few weeks later,
another account (Anon., 1963h) claimed that “more than
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$600,000 in private property was lost at Barrow” during
the storm. Various accounts filled in specific details. The
storm damaged or destroyed numerous skin and wood
boats, three generators recently landed from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs supply ship North Star, and a 200-foot radio
tower, brought down when two houses crashed into the
guy wires supporting it. “About 1000 barrels [of fuel oil]
were lost when the waves crashed into piles of drums and
scattered them helter skelter. Some of them washed out to
sea…. Huge oil tanks were ruptured by the force of the
waves and they spewed their contents into the streets and
into a fresh water lake used by Barrow for water” (Rock,
1963). This probably occurred where Isatquaq Lagoon is
now located (Fig. 1).
Citizens and officials alike improvised responses to the
emergency, focusing first on taking care of storm victims.
But their efforts were hampered by fire danger, damaged
infrastructure, and the blizzard that followed the storm.
While Okakok waited in Kignak’s house, he heard by radio
that “they needed able-bodied men to watch over people.
They were urged not to smoke, even near the lagoon. The
man on the radio said that big tanks had broken and were
pouring oil all over the place” (Okakok, 1963). Flooding
limited evacuation between Browerville and the main part
of town to heavy vehicles; the road from NARL to town
was impassable. The airfield under construction in Barrow
was pressed into emergency service after the airfield at
NARL became unusable and was shut down. Another early
report affirmed that “the immediate work of caring for
displaced persons is the first job being handled by offi-
cials. Even this work is being hampered by continued
winds gusting to 40 mph, with snow. Visibility in the area
is poor, and no air traffic could get into or leave Barrow on
Sunday” (Anon., 1963b).
However, one plane did reach Barrow on Friday, the
day after the storm. It was a single-engine plane piloted by
Wien Alaska Airlines’ Ed Parsons on a mission to restore
communications for all transpolar flights. On Saturday, an
Air Force cargo plane brought the first relief: blankets for
several homeless families. A Wien DC-3 also brought
freight. Relief officials arriving by air that day “repre-
sented the Red Cross and state civil defense, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Corps of Engineers and Golden Valley
Electric Co-op of Fairbanks” (Anon., 1963b). The co-op
sought to restore electric power to the village. The state
and the airline sought to expedite compaction of the new
airfield to bring in needed freight. Within a few weeks, an
American Red Cross representative announced hopes “to
have 26 storm-destroyed or damaged homes at Barrow
rebuilt and repaired before December 1” (Anon., 1963g).
The Red Cross expected to prefabricate some replacement
homes and package them for air delivery, at a total cost of
$100 000. At about the same time, the Small Business
Administration announced that it had “declared Barrow a
disaster area for the purpose of making low-interest loans
available to restore homes and businesses damaged or
destroyed in the October 3 storm” (Anon., 1963h).
The available reports on the restoration of utilities are
scanty. Just after the storm, it was reported that another
lake near Imikpuk Lake was “expected to freeze to the
bottom shortly, as the middle of winter approaches. It will
be possible for people to get ice [for water] from this lake,
but the contaminated lake will be out of commission for
several years” (Anon., 1963e). Within two months after
the storm, Golden Valley Electric restored electric power
using several generators, including one from the Native
co-op store. By that time, the new distribution system for
electric power was all but completed (Anon., 1963j, k).
Surviving fuel oil reserves in Barrow were estimated to be
enough to last for four or five months. Fuel oil losses
prompted the Navy to expedite a project, already approved
by Congress, to drill a natural gas well for Barrow village
in the nearby national petroleum reserve (Anon., 1963i).
The first deliveries of natural gas from the well were made
in December 1964 (Anon., 1965).
THE LARGER CONTEXT
To clarify Barrow’s vulnerability, we consider the 1963
storm in the larger context of other storms in the region
over the decades. Barrow’s vulnerability depends on the
frequency and intensity of storms that track near Barrow,
the direction and duration of their winds at Barrow, and the
location and concentration of sea ice. Its vulnerability also
depends on the people, property, and other things of value
at risk (Pielke, 1997), including archaeological sites.
The storms or low-pressure systems of interest often form
in favorable regions along the Arctic front (See Fig. 2). These
regions are evident in Siberia in summer and persist into
the autumn (e.g., Serreze et al., 2001). From Siberia, low-
pressure systems tend to migrate through the Laptev, East
Siberian, and Chukchi seas and then northward into the
Arctic Ocean, rather than eastward into the eastern Chukchi
or Beaufort seas (Serreze et al., 1993). In general, the
eastern Chukchi and western Beaufort seas, where the
1963 storm reached maximum intensity, are a region of
low frequency and intensity for low-pressure systems
compared to other regions of the Arctic. Keegan (1958), in
one of the earliest climatologies for the Arctic, noted a
pronounced minimum of low-pressure systems in this
region, while LeDrew (1983, 1985), in climatologies for
the winters and summers of 1975 and 1976, found that
depressions off the North Slope coast are very rare.
In the Chukchi-Beaufort region over the last 50 years,
there has been a small but statistically significant increase
in the intensity of summer storms as gauged by the depth
of the central low pressure (Lynch et al., 2004). The trend
in the frequency of low-pressure systems is not signifi-
cant; nor is it linear, according to the convergent results of
researchers using different methods (Maslanik et al., 1996;
Walsh et al., 1996; Lynch et al., 2004). In the record of
high-wind events in the Chukchi-Beaufort region from
1945 to the present, the frequency of storms was relatively
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low from the late 1960s through the mid 1980s, though
higher before and after that period (Lynch at al., 2004).
This pattern is consistent with the dramatic shift toward
low-pressure systems over the central Arctic Basin ob-
served in the late 1980s, resulting from the shift of a large-
scale air mass to the North Pacific (Walsh et al., 1996;
Cullather and Lynch, 2003).
These storm patterns interact with sea-ice cover to
affect the severity of storm impacts on the coastal environ-
ment. Light-ice years are associated with more low-pres-
sure activity in the East Siberian Sea (Rogers, 1978). The
question is whether the location and concentration of the
sea-ice cover influence the tracks of storms in this region,
or vice versa. The sea-ice cover does not appear to influ-
ence strongly either the intensity or the tracks of deep low-
pressure systems in the western Arctic (Maslanik et al.,
1996; Lynch et al., 2002). Rather, the low-pressure sys-
tems influence the sea-ice cover. Increased low-pressure
activity north of Siberia since the late 1980s has exposed
the marginal ice zone to more frequent warm southerly
wind events as the warm sectors of the cyclones pass over
the ice. This exposure has had the effect of enhancing both
ice melt and northward retreat of the ice pack. Thus the
extension of the storm track through the Chukchi and
Beaufort seas is associated with strong ice retreat in this
region (e.g., Maslanik et al., 1999). The sea-ice retreat can
be expected to magnify the impact of summer and autumn
storms, which have increased in intensity and, since the
late 1980s, in frequency.
In this context, the October 1963 storm was highly
unusual, although the large fetch can be considered an
expected consequence of the storm track, for reasons
outlined above. This low-pressure system formed along
the Arctic frontal zone over Siberia and traveled
northeastward to the East Siberian Sea. At this point,
rather than tracking northward into the central Arctic
Ocean as is typical for such systems, the depression turned
in a more eastward direction, steered and strengthened by
the jet stream, into the Chukchi Sea and thence to the
Beaufort Sea. What was most unusual about this system,
however, was not its track or intensity, but its warm core,
more typical of mid-latitude ocean regions. No other
example of an intense, warm-cored system has been found
in the meteorological record of this part of the Arctic. The
FIG. 2. Normal and selected storm tracks near Barrow.
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storms of record are all cold-cored. Warm-cored systems
are more likely to develop explosively and to draw energy
from the open water below.
At least 30 storms have produced high winds at Barrow
since October 1963. Remarkably, no fatalities or serious
injuries have been attributed to any of them. However,
some of these storms are more notable than others in terms
of their intensity, impacts, and human responses.
• 12 and 20 September 1986: The first of these storms
from the southwest had peak and sustained winds of 56
and 38 mph, respectively, but the second storm was
even stronger, with peak and sustained winds of 65 and
49 mph. Contemporary reports placed the ice out over
200 miles. They emphasized the loss of House Mound
59, an archaeological site with human remains, from
erosion of bluffs at the southern edge of Barrow, which
also left George Leavitt’s house “suspended perilously
over a 35 foot drop into the ocean.” Estimated damage
to roads and structures in Barrow and Wainwright, a
smaller village southwest of Barrow, was over $7.5
million (Anon., 1986).
• 25 February 1989: This storm hit from the southwest
when the ice was in, with peak and sustained winds of
73 and 55 mph, respectively, and reported gusts close to
100 mph. There were reports of “piled shore ice up to
eight feet in height [and 100 feet inland] blocking roads
and pushed up dangerously close to buildings, snapped
telephone poles, damaged roofs, broken windows and
various other types of structural damage.” The wind
knocked a house under construction off its foundation,
flipped over one airplane, and damaged several others.
An early estimate of total damage to the North Slope
Borough, including both private and public property,
was over $500 000 (Anon., 1989).
• 10 August 2000: This storm hit from the west when the
ice was out, with peak and sustained winds of 75 and
55 mph, respectively, equivalent to the October 1963
storm but not as long-lasting. The major loss, at $7
million, was the dredge Qayuuttaq. The storm ripped it
from its anchors and washed it ashore, flooding it and
damaging its starboard hull (USACE, 2001:5). About
35 private homes and four public housing units sus-
tained roof and siding damage. Waves washed out a
gravel seawall and a culvert crossing at Middle Salt
Lagoon and damaged the road along the coast once
again. The initial total damage estimate was about $7.7
million (Ahmaogak, 2000).
For comparison, the estimated damage from the Octo-
ber 1963 storm ($3.25 million in 1963 dollars) is roughly
equivalent to $19 million in 2000 dollars. However, the
actual damage from each storm is unclear because of
unresolved questions about what was included in or ex-
cluded from each estimate. Additional factors complicate
comparison of damages and their significance. For exam-
ple, the federal government, not the villagers, sustained
most of the damage in the 1963 storm. For the August 2000
storm, insurance covered $6 million of the $7 million in
damage to the dredge, and $830 000 was later added to the
initial estimate to cover the cost of replacing the gravel
seawall (Neakok, 2000).
Despite the decline in damages since October 1963,
later storms appear to have prompted more efforts by the
community to reduce its vulnerability. In particular, the
September 1986 storms drew attention to effects of coastal
erosion in Barrow and Wainwright. As a result, the North
Slope Borough commissioned studies that came together
in a report entitled “Mitigation Alternatives for Coastal
Erosion” (BTS/LCMF, 1989). This report, released two
months after the February 1989 storm, led to approval of
a beach nourishment program, which included the custom-
designed dredge Qayuuttaq, in the summer of 1992. The
dredge lifted material from the sea floor and deposited it
on the beach, in Wainwright in 1995 and in Barrow
beginning in 1996. The August 2000 storm terminated
those operations, as noted above. The damaged dredge was
towed to Seattle for repairs, but put up for sale instead.
North Slope Borough Mayor George N. Ahmaogok, Sr.
(2001) cited the August 2000 storm in a letter expressing
support for a feasibility study proposed by the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. Now approved by the federal govern-
ment and underway, the study as proposed includes beach
nourishment, elevation of the coastal road, and “harden-
ing” of the seaward side of the road with a concrete
mattress revetment. In his letter, the Mayor wrote: “The
study is a critical step in determining the protection of
enormous capital infrastructure essential to the health and
safety of residents of Barrow. The recent storm last August
attests to the urgency to provide coastal storm damage
protection for our community.” The capital infrastructure
includes an underground utility corridor heavily insulated
from permafrost, which contains water, sewage, and some
power lines, as well as communication facilities. This
“utilidor” began service to Barrow residents in 1984, at a
cost of $270 million (USACE, 2001:3 – 4); recent addi-
tions have employed a less expensive direct bury technol-
ogy. Modernization on a more modest scale was already
underway in 1963 at the insistence of Barrow residents
(Anon., 1963a), but accelerated after incorporation of the
North Slope Borough in July 1972 (Hess, 1993). The
number of people in Barrow has more than tripled since
1963, to almost 5000. Thus more people and more property
are exposed to extreme weather events now than in 1963.
The October 1963 storm has been cited in support of
major programs to address the erosion problem. For exam-
ple, a key document in the approval of the beach nourish-
ment program noted that “insufficient information is
available to determine the occurrence intervals for storms
similar to those in 1954, 1963 and 1986…. However, we
feel the probability of another occurrence in the next 25-30
years is very high.” These storms were later described as
“the three most notable episodes of bluff erosion” (BTS/
LCMF, 1989:I, 3). The proposal for a feasibility study also
cites the 1963 storm in connection with erosion rates
(USACE, 2001:5). However, the formal emergency
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management plan developed by Emergency Response In-
stitute International, Inc. (2000) for the North Slope Bor-
ough does not attempt to harvest the experience of human
impacts and responses from the 1963 storm or other ex-
treme weather events on the North Slope. It does clarify
formal authorities and responsibilities for emergency man-
agement based on a template designed for any community.
On the basis of information presently available, it appears
that the policy implications of the 1963 storm and subse-
quent storms in Barrow have not been exhausted.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Given the diversity of storms and their impacts on
Barrow in the past, and the probability of additional cli-
mate changes, policies to reduce Barrow’s vulnerability
cannot anticipate in sufficient detail all the possible im-
pacts of major storms in the future. This means that
improvisations like those observed in the 1963 storm are
necessary and inevitable in emergency responses to the
next disaster, that resilience is necessary to minimize
disruptions and expedite recovery from the unanticipated
impacts of a disaster, and that flexibility is necessary to
incorporate what is learned from each disaster and thus
reduce vulnerability over the long term. For such pur-
poses, policy planning can be improved by harvesting
additional experience gained from big storms in Barrow on
a continuous basis.
For emergency responses, an earlier warning of the
impending storm is an important priority. An earlier warn-
ing would reduce threats to life and limb by alerting
families like the Okakoks to stay together, or by giving
them more time to get together and find shelter on high
ground before evacuation routes are blocked. The 1963
storm suggests that children, the elderly, and perhaps other
especially vulnerable people need the care of family and
friends who are better able to find safety and improvise
when necessary. An earlier warning would provide more
time to secure sheet metal, plywood, and similar materials
before they are picked up by winds and turned into poten-
tially lethal flying objects. It would also provide more time
for the Borough’s Department of Municipal Services to
construct temporary gravel seawalls that would reduce
threats to public safety and critical infrastructure from
erosion and flooding. In the 20 September 1986 storm at
least, heavy equipment operators were ordered off the
beach before the temporary construction job was com-
pleted because it became too dangerous.
Planning might anticipate disruptions that have ham-
pered emergency operations or recovery from storms in
the past and target vulnerable areas as priorities for miti-
gation. For example, the 10 August 2000 storm, like earlier
storms, once again washed out sections of the coastal road,
hampering emergency operations until temporary repairs
restored traffic the next day. Redundancies, reserves, and
other proven methods for coping with uncertainties might
be employed more explicitly and broadly. Redundancies
in October 1963 included an alternative to the coastal road
for evacuation from NARL, heavy equipment to back up
cars as means of transportation, a partially completed
airfield to back up the damaged airfield at NARL, and
multiple generators and sources of fresh water. Reserves
of fuel oil were sufficient to provide winter heat for several
months, even though much fuel oil was lost. Since October
1963, safety valves have been installed on natural gas
pipelines—including those buried ten feet inland from the
coastal road—to shut off the flow of gas automatically if
a line breaks. The valves reduce danger to emergency
operations and leave other parts of the distribution system
intact. A similar concept might be developed for the
utilidor. At present, two of the lift stations at low points in
the gravity-fed sewer system are exposed to erosion along
the coast. If these stations were breached during a storm,
the whole utilidor could be flooded up to the height of the
storm surge and waves. If they were retrofitted with bulk-
heads and backups, however, the damage might be limited
and service more quickly restored.
Some additional possibilities for reducing vulnerability
over the long term have been suggested by community
members but not yet fully explored or implemented. These
include planning and zoning to prevent further develop-
ment in coastal areas vulnerable to erosion and flooding.
This possibility was considered along with the beach
nourishment program in the summer of 1992, and may or
may not have been part of the policy approved at that time;
sources available differ on this point. In either case, how-
ever, a planning and zoning policy has not been fully
implemented. The Borough’s new veterinary clinic, for
example, was built in 1998 in an area of Browerville that
had been flooded in October 1963. A planning and zoning
policy could help the community “roll back,” removing
community infrastructure from vulnerable areas along the
coast and relocating or building new infrastructure inland,
to reduce its vulnerability a step at time, at a pace and
locations to be determined by extreme weather events in
the future. Also suggested in the summer of 1992 was a
possible means of reducing the costs of beach nourish-
ment, by mining gravel from the barrier islands east of
Barrow and trucking it across Elson Lagoon in winter,
when the lagoon’s shallow waters are frozen solid to the
ground. Other possibilities suggested by community mem-
bers, and still pending, include location of a proposed new
hospital outside the flood plain; construction of a new road
inland from the coast that would provide an alternative
evacuation route from NARL; and design of a new $35
million Global Climate Change Research facility at NARL
to withstand a flood of the magnitude experienced in
October 1963. Similar possibilities for long-term reduc-
tions in vulnerability to extreme weather events will arise
in the normal course of community development. Planning
and action need not be limited to programs focused on
erosion control.
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Three decades of research on natural hazards and disas-
ters elsewhere can suggest additional possibilities for
reducing vulnerability in Barrow (e.g., Mileti, 1999;
Tierney et al., 2001). But experience elsewhere is no
substitute for attending to the situation in Barrow, or in
other communities on the North Slope, each of which is
unique for policy purposes. To exploit the possibilities,
whatever their origins, a community generally has a win-
dow of opportunity in the immediate aftermath of a disas-
ter (Ungar, 1995). The opportunity typically includes the
practical necessity and political will to reconstruct what
can be reconstructed, as well as disaster relief and other
resources that tend to converge on a devastated community
from outside. The window of opportunity is likely to close,
however, unless the community is prepared to act quickly
under policies already in place when the window opens. In
the absence of such policies, the default often is to rebuild
damaged structures in the same place, leaving them as
vulnerable as before.
CONCLUSIONS
Any specific policy implications of the 1963 disaster in
the larger context are necessarily tentative because re-
search is ongoing and because the context in Barrow and
the North Slope continues to evolve. Stepping back from
the details above, however, we can be relatively confident
in three general conclusions.
The scientific conclusion is that profound uncertainties
are inherent in the task of reducing Barrow’s vulnerability,
which arises from unique interactions among many rel-
evant factors, each the focus of a particular scientific
specialization. The factors include variability and change
in weather and climate, sea-ice cover, the coastline, and
the pattern and pace of modernization in Barrow, as well
as the individual and collective acts of people in Barrow.
Some acts in direct response to environmental factors, like
the beach nourishment program, have changed the ocean
floor and coastline, with consequences not fully under-
stood. Other acts, like mining the beach for construction
materials in earlier decades, have had unintended conse-
quences. Mining probably exposed parts of Barrow’s coast-
line and bluffs to erosion and accelerated erosion rates
(Walker, 1991). Significant human acts alone are enough
to make this an open, evolving context in which uncertain-
ties cannot be eliminated through scientific research
(Oreskes et al., 1994). Thus uncertainties will persist in
estimating Barrow’s vulnerability and the consequences
of any action expected, on the best available knowledge
and information, to advance the common interest of the
community.
The policy conclusion is that sound policies will go
beyond science to include judgments that clarify the com-
munity values at stake and construct the relevant context
as events unfold. Considered in narrow context, the 1963
disaster demonstrates where and how public safety has
been threatened, property damaged, and the coastline
eroded and flooded to the maximum extent in Barrow’s
known past. It therefore clarifies possible areas of vulner-
ability to storms in the future. Considered in larger con-
text, however, the 1963 disaster is highly unusual. No
other storm since 1963 has been nearly so damaging,
despite more high-wind events since the mid-1980s and
the exposure of more people and property through popula-
tion growth and modernization. Perhaps present vulner-
ability is much less than that inferred from the 1963
disaster alone; or perhaps Barrow has just been fortunate.
Considered in global context, the significance of the 1963
disaster and subsequent storms in Barrow is unclear. Ex-
pectations from global change research are that the fre-
quency and intensity of storms—and their impacts—are
increasing. However, the regional pattern over the last
several decades partially contradicts those expectations
and is much more complicated. Thus, whatever the contri-
bution of global change research, sound policies to reduce
vulnerability in Barrow must take into account unique
interactions there among the many relevant factors. Sound
policies also will allow for corrective action, if and when
expectations about the appropriate values and context turn
out to have been mistaken (Brunner, 2000).
The governance conclusion is that the people of Barrow
are in a better position than anyone else to understand
unique interactions in Barrow, to decide on sound policies
for Barrow, and to take responsibility for those policy
decisions. They understand the community’s values better
than anyone else. They can decide whether to prepare for
a future disaster like the October 1963 storm, the August
2000 storm, or some other scenario. They can evaluate the
expected consequences of alternative courses of action
according to the best available knowledge and informa-
tion, local and scientific, and learn from the consequences
of the actions taken. Responsibility comes from the fact
that they must live with the direct consequences of those
actions, good and bad, so long as they reside in Barrow—
unlike remote decision makers in Juneau, in Washington,
D.C., or in the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change. In these respects, Barrow is similar to thousands
of other unique communities around the globe that are
vulnerable to climate change and variability. Climate
change is not an irreducibly global problem (Brunner,
2001).
Compared to many other communities, however, Bar-
row has a richer array of cultural resources to draw upon.
To mitigate the demanding climate of the North Slope,
Barrow has access to modern science and technology as
represented by the utilidor, the beach nourishment pro-
gram, and resident and visiting scientists. But Barrow also
has access to the traditional knowledge and skills of Native
people who have survived for thousands of years in that
climate. Rock (1963) saw the value of traditional culture in
the October 1963 disaster: “It was a freak storm. It had to
be dealt with quick thinking and without panic…. It was a
classic example of survival of man in the Arctic.” In a
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broader context, Masks and Songs (1982:7) contrasted
“the fragmented perception of the non-Native world in
which man is separated from the land” with the Native
world in which “we have learned to view the community as
a comprehensive whole, whose members include: plants,
animals, soil, air, water, cosmos, spirits and man.” The
implication of this Native view is that “The duty of man is
not to change nature, but to adapt himself to Nature”
(Masks and Songs, 1982:8).
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